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Abstract 
Comparative studies using a rational choice approach have successfully explained variation 
in the degree of institutional parliamentary strength in EU affairs, but they perform less 
well with regard to explaining both actual parliamentary behaviour and variation thereof. 
The paper therefore develops an explanation for parliamentary behaviour based on agency 
theory and the model of delegation. The aim is to enrich rational choice approaches, which 
have so far focused mainly on the preference of re-election and have therefore - at least 
implicitly  -  conceptualised  parliamentarians  as  agents  of  their  voters  or  parties.  In 
parliamentary systems, however, MPs are not only agents of the voters (or parties), but also 
principals of the government. The paper is based on Strøm’s rational choice institutionalist 
conception  of  parliamentary  roles  as  ‘routines,  driven  by  reasons  (preferences),  and 
constrained by rules’ (Strøm 1997: 158), but uses Merton’s concept of ‘role-sets’ (Merton 
1957) to analyse parliamentary agent- and principal-relationships as different elements of 
the role-set ‘MP’ associated with specific routines driven by specific preferences.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the early 1990s the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union (EU) has developed 
into one of the major and most debated topics in European politics. Within this debate, the 
role of national parliaments has generated a considerable body of literature. Much of the early 
literature  consisted  of  informative,  but  often  descriptive,  accounts  of  the  institutional 
adaptation  of  national  parliaments  to  the  challenges  of  integration,  detailing  institutional 
provisions and scrutiny procedures. However, the last years have also seen a growing number 
of  comparative  studies  and  theoretical  contributions  that  aim  at  classifying  national 
parliaments according to their institutional position in European affairs (e.g. Bergman 2000a; 
Maurer 2001), and at explaining institutional variation (Raunio 2005; Saalfeld 2005). The 
latter have explained variation in the degree of institutional parliamentary strength in EU 
affairs with two main variables, the power of parliament independent of European integration 
and the electoral salience of / public opinion on European integration. However, while these 
studies convincingly assess and explain institutional variation, they perform less well with 
regard  to  actual  parliamentary  behaviour.  First,  they  focus  only  on  formal  parliamentary 
rights  of  influence  and  are  thus  based  on  the  debatable  assumption  that  institutional 
capabilities equal parliamentary behaviour. Yet as studies have shown, national parliaments 
often make little use of their institutional rights (e.g. Auel 2006, Pollack and Slominski 2003), in other words, what parliaments can do is not necessarily what they actually do in reality. 
Second, based on the - implicit or explicit - assumption that the reluctant use of institutional 
rights is a sign of ‘behavioural reticence’ (Saalfeld 2003) they tend to ignore the possibility 
that national parliaments have found other means to get involved in EU affairs. Indeed, while 
some parliaments focus on informally influencing the position of the government for Council 
negotiations, others concentrate on holding the government publicly to account for their EU 
policies (Auel and Benz 2005). As a result, they are also unable to explain parliamentary 
behaviour  that  seems  counter-productive  from  a  rational  point  of  view,  such  as  costly, 
because time consuming, activities in EU affairs that take place behind closed doors and will 
thus  have  few  direct  electoral  benefits  for  the  MPs  involved.  Auel  and  Benz  (2005),  in 
contrast, do compare parliamentary behaviour in terms of both, the use of institutional rights 
and the development of more informal strategies of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs 
across a small number of parliaments. However, while they can explain the reasons for the 
development of such alternative strategies they fail to provide a more general explanation for 
the variation in parliamentary behaviour they observe.  
The  paper  therefore  develops  an  explanation  for  parliamentary  behaviour  based  on 
integrating the idea of parliamentary roles and the principal-agent model. As Wahlke and his 
associates (1962: 9) famously argued, ‘the chief utility of the role theory model of legislative 
behavior is that, unlike other models, it pinpoints those aspects of legislators’ behavior which 
make  the  legislature  an  institution’.  The  aim  is  to  enrich  rational  choice  conceptions  of 
legislative behaviour which have so far mainly focused on the preference of re-election and 
thus - implicitly - on the role of legislators as the agent of their party or voters. The main 
argument is that MPs in parliamentary systems are not only agents, but also principals of the 
government and that any analysis of parliamentary behaviour needs to take their preferences 
as principals into account.  
The  paper  proceeds  in  six  sections.  The  first  section  gives  a  short  overview  over  the 
rational choice literature in legislative behaviour with a particular focus on Strøm’s (1997) 
rational choice neo-institutionalist conception of parliamentary roles and introduces the role 
of  MPs  as  principals  of  the  government.  Section  2  uses  Merton’s  concept  of  ‘role-sets’ 
(Merton 1957) to discuss the three main agent- and principal-relationships associated with the 
status of MP. Using agency theory, it will argue that the roles of agent of the voters, agent of 
the party and principal of the government are, in turn, associated with specific preferences: As 
agents,  MPs’  most  important  preference  is  to  secure  their  re-authorisation,  i.e.  to  be  re-
selected/re-nominated  as  the  agent  of  their  party  and  to  be  re-elected  by  the  voters.  As 
principals, the most important preference is to induce their agent (the government) to act in 
accordance  with  their  interests,  i.e.  to  minimise  agency  loss.  Section  4  discusses 
parliamentary strategies MPs can use to pursue their preferences as both agents and principals 
in general. Based on the assumption that MPs preferences are hierarchically ordered, with the 
preference of re-authorisation as agent being more important, it will be argued that in their 
role as principals MPs will choose strategies of minimising agency loss that will advance, or 
at least not hurt, the realisation of their preferences as agents. Section 5 then turns to the field 
of European affairs and looks in more detail at the strategies MPs can employ to minimise 
agency loss. It argues that the that the choice of strategies depends on their payoff in terms of reducing agency loss relative to their costs and discusses specific institutional incentives and 
constraints  that  will  have  an  impact  on  both.  Section  six  draws  the  arguments  together, 
provides some empirical illustrations and concludes.  
Explaining Legislative Behaviour: Rational Choice and Legislative Roles  
Rational choice approaches to legislative behaviour have long been reluctant to develop 
specific  conceptions  of  legislative  roles  or  to  even  use  the  term.  Rather,  rational  choice 
approaches have sought to explain legislative behaviour with economic models of individual 
behaviour models stressing individual preferences and strategic choices (e.g., Fenno 1973; 
Mayhew 1974; Shepsle 1978; Smith and Deering 1984).
1 Rational choice neo-institutionalism 
has expanded the perspective and paid attention to the constraining impact of institutions and 
formal rules as ‘the strategic context in which optimizing behaviour takes place’ (Shepsle 
1989: 35, see also for example Laver and Shepsle 1996, Huber 1996a). Theorists increasingly 
understood that ‘formal models can best advance our understanding of legislatures when they 
are enriched by with institutional detail’ (Shepsle and Weingast 1994: 145).  
Much of literature on legislative behaviour has been developed through analysis based on 
the United States Congress (but see Doering 1995) and focuses on career goals of legislators 
to  explain  behaviour.  In  one  of  the  earliest  and  most  influential  contributions,  Mayhews 
argued that legislative behaviour could be best understood if legislators were see as ‘single-
minded  seekers  of  reelection’  (Mayhews  1974:  5),  re-election  being  the  preference  that 
‘underlies everything else, as indeed it should if we are to expect that the relations between 
politicians and public will be one of accountability’ (ibid.: 16-7). Although later works have 
presented a more nuanced perspective on legislators’ preferences, the re-election or career 
goal remained prominent in the literature (Katznelson and Weingast 2005: 8). Schlesinger, for 
example, defined the main preference of legislators by the broader term of ‘political ambition’ 
(Schlesinger  1991:  39f.)  and  distinguished  between  discrete  ambition  (the  aim  to  gain  a 
specific  office  for  one  term),  static  ambition  (to  keep  the  office  for  several  terms)  and 
progressive  ambition  (to  gain  a  more  powerful  office).  In  contrast,  Fenno  (1973)  in  his 
seminal  work  on  Congress  Committees,  broadened  the  narrow  focus  on  re-election  and 
included  ‘influence  within  the  House’  and  ‘good  public  policy’  as  two  further  basic 
preferences or goals of Members of Congress. But in his later work, he still argued that 
legislators ‘want to get nominated and elected, then renominated and re-elected. For most 
members of Congress most of the time, this electoral goal is primary (Fenno 1977: 889). 
Similarly, Cox and McCubbins accept ‘the usual emphasis on re-election’ as not necessarily 
the only, but an important component of legislators’ motivation that ‘is reasonable to consider 
in isolation’ (Cox and McCubbins 1993: 100).  
The first explicit rational choice neo-institutionalist conception of parliamentary roles has 
been developed by Kaare Strøm, who defines ‘parliamentary roles … [as] routines, driven by 
                                                        
1   As Searing criticised, ‘the informal rules, the norms and roles of homo sociologicus, have been pushed 
aside by the reasons of homo economicus, by a new interest in the preferences and calculations of 
individual politicians’ (Searing 1991: 1240-1). His famous motivational approach therefore combines 
sociological and rational choice institutionalist approaches, see Searing 1991, 1994. reasons (preferences), and constrained by rules’ (Strøm 1997: 158, italics in original). Roles 
are  thus  seen  as  patterns  of  behavioural  strategies  that  legislators  employ  to  pursue  their 
exogenous goals within a given institutional context:  
‘Roles  are  routines,  regular  patterns  of  behaviour.  But  although  such  routines  may  be 
shaped by cultural expectations as well as by personal idiosyncracies, they are most likely of 
all to flow from reasoned and deliberate pursuits in which parliamentarians engage. Besides 
all their other charming idiosyncracies, legislators are goal-seeking men or women who chose 
their behaviour to fit the destinations they have in mind. In doing so they have to pay close 
attention to the institutions in which they operate. The institutional features that most matter 
are partly those of the legislature itself, but also those of their national and local parties, as 
well as the rules of the electoral process’ (Strøm 1997: 158). 
Based  on  the  literature  on  legislative  behaviour  outlined  above,  Strøm  distinguishes 
between  four  types  of  parliamentary  goals  or,  in  other  words,  components  of  the 
parliamentary utility function: (1) reselection (renomination), (2) reelection, (3) party office, 
and (4) legislative office (Strøm 1991: 160). In addition, Strøm argues that these legislative 
goals are interrelated and hierarchically ordered: reselection or renomination as a candidate is 
the essential prerequisite for being reelected, which in turn is the fundamental precondition of 
parliamentary  membership.  Thus,  the  ‘iron-clad  necessity  of  election  in  democratic 
legislatures makes the “single-minded pursuit of reelection” the primary instrumental goal of 
legislators’ (Strøm 1997: 160).  The hierarchy between the latter two, party and legislative 
office, is less strict. They can be distinguished with regard to who controls the nomination or 
election process, the party or parliament as a whole (or a cross-party subset). Strøm argues, 
‘partisan office is probably more likely to be a precondition for advancement in legislative 
office, rather than vice versa’, but suggests this necessity may be less strict outside of the 
Westminster model (Strøm 1997: 161).  
Parliamentarians,  Strøm  continues,  therefore  have  to  make  strategic  choices  how  they 
commit their scarce resources (such as time, voting power or media access) to the pursuit of 
these goals. In other words, ‘strategies of parliamentarians are prescriptions, or game plans, 
that help them align their employment of resources with their objectives’ (Strøm 1997: 163). 
However, in the choice of their strategies they are influenced by the institutional context that 
provides specific constraints and incentives:   
‘The political institutions that most powerfully enable and constrain parliamentarians are 
those that regulate their attainment of ballot access, reelection, party office and legislative 
office. The first two of these objectives will be conditioned in large part by the electoral 
system (but also by party organisation). The third and fourth objectives are most directly 
affected by party and legislative organisation and procedure’ (Strøm 1997: 163, italics in 
original). 
The great advantage of Strøm’s analytical framework is that it takes institutional variation 
systematically  into  account,  which  expands  the  so  far  dominant  US  Congress  focus  and 
provides  a  useful  framework  for  cross-national  analysis  of  parliamentary  systems  of 
government  as  well.  However,  the  analysis  suffers  from  one  shortcoming,  namely  that  it 
focuses only on specific career goals. Seen through the lens of agency theory, it can be argued 
that legislators are only conceptionalised as agents of either their voters or their parties. Since 
the seminal work of Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) agency theory and the principal-agent model have been prominent approaches to the study of political representation. They defined 
the agency relationship as ‘established when an agent is delegated … the authority to take 
action on behalf of … the principal’ (ibid.: 239-240). The goal of re-selection and re-election 
thus refers to the aim of being re-authorised as an agent, while gaining legislative or party 
office  refers  to  the  aim  of  becoming  –  for  want  of  a  more  precise  term  -  a  more 
important/powerful  agent.  This  narrow  focus  may  be  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  Strøm’s 
conceptual scheme to capture the range of legislators’ objectives or goals is mainly based on 
the literature examining legislative behaviour in the US Congress (Strøm 1997: 157) and thus 
in a presidential system with a clear separation of power. And while the insights from this 
body of literature are indeed more broadly applicable and helpful in analysing legislative 
behaviour in parliamentary systems as well, as Strøm demonstrates, they cover only part of 
the parliamentary story. Indeed, agency theory has been fruitfully used by Strøm, Bergman 
and Müller (Bergman et al. 2000; Strøm et al. 2003) to model parliamentary systems, the most 
common form of system of government in Europe, as a single chain of delegation (Strøm 
2003: 65):  
 
(1)  From voters to elected representatives (legislators), 
(2)  From legislators to the chief executive (the prime minister) and his or her cabinet, 
(3)  From the cabinet and the chief executive to the “line ministers” (typically individual 
cabinet members) that head the different executive departments, and 
(4)  From cabinet members, in their capacity as heads of different executive departments 
(ministries), to civil servants within their agencies. 
 
Of particular importance in parliamentary systems (in contrast to presidential systems) is 
therefore the fact that upon entering office MPs not only become agents of their voters or 
parties,  but  also  principals  of  the  government.  ‘Being  elected  by  the  governed,  MPs  are 
expected to control the government. … Any analysis of the roles of MPs in parliamentary systems  must  take  into  account  these  two  faces  of  parliamentary  life,  and  must  combine 
“representation” and “executive-legislative relations”’ (Andeweg 1997: 110). 
 MPs And Their Role-Set 
Robert Merton defined a role-set as the ‘complement of role-relationships in which persons 
are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status’ (Merton 1957: 110). He thus 
distinguishes a role-set from the concept of multiple roles, which ‘refers not to the complex of 
roles associated with a single social status, but with the various social statuses … in which 
people find themselves’ (Merton 1957: 111). To illustrate the difference: on the one hand, a 
person who is teacher will occupy multiple other roles, for example the roles of father, son, 
husband, neighbour etc. His social status as a teacher, on the other hand, is connected to a 
number of roles relating him not only to students, but also to their parents, to colleagues, the 
school principal, etc.  
Merton’s concept of role-sets is particularly helpful for the analysis of the different roles 
MPs occupy. There are three very basic relationships connected to the role-set of MP: that to 
their party, to their voters and to the government. First, MPs are typically
2 agents of their 
party, who have put them forward as candidates (Müller 2000: 309). Secondly, they are in 
they are agents of their voters (electorate) and, thirdly, they are principals of the government.
3  
As I will argue in the following, each of these components of the parliamentary role-set 
comes with specific preferences, which are not necessarily compatible. The argument is based 
on the basic assumptions of agency theory and the delegation model.  
Agency  theory  argues  that  any  delegation  of  power  to  an  agent  creates  risks  for  the 
principal.
4 Once entrusted by the principal, the agent is expected to realise the principal’s 
interest.  Insofar  as  his  own  interests  diverge  from  those  of  the  principal,  however,  he  is 
inclined to realise his own interests at the cost of the principal’s. As a result, the agent fails to 
act in the best interest of her principal (shirking) or might even act against the interests of the 
principal  (sabotage)  (Brehm  and  Gates  1997).  These  problems  are  severely  increased  by 
asymmetries of information between the principal and the agent with regard to information on 
the agent’s preferences and skills as well as information on the concrete circumstances of the 
task to fulfil (hidden information) and information on the agent’s actions (hidden action). 
While the former mainly results in adverse selection (selection of an unsuitable agent), the 
latter may lead to moral hazard (the agent acts not in accordance with the interests of the 
principal;  shirking  and  sabotage).  As  a  result,  delegation  is  fraught  with  a  fundamental 
dilemma: ‘the principal needs the agent in order to get a task done but cannot trust the agent 
to act truly in [her] interest; the agent, on the other hand, wants to be assigned the task but can 
                                                        
2   Although rare, MPs can also be independents. In this case, a relationship to their own party is, of 
course, not part of the role-set.  
3   This is, of course, not an exhaustive list of the roles related to the status of ‘Parliamentarian’, which will 
typically include other relationships such as those to their assistants or secretaries, colleagues from 
other parties, Committee Chairs etc.   
4  For a detailed discussion see Akerlof 1970; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia 2003.  only [continue to, K.A.] obtain the task if [he] proves trustworthy to the principal’ (Behnke 
2008: 14, see also Fenno 1977: 898-9).  
MPs as Agents 
The preferences of MPs as agents of their voters or parties are rather straightforward. As 
agents  of  their  parties  MPs  will  mainly  seek  re-selection/re-nomination  as  an  electoral 
candidate, which is, of course, the fundamental prerequisite for re-election. In addition, they 
may have ambitions for party office, i.e. to become a more powerful agent. As agents of their 
voters, their main preference will be re-election. In other words, as agents MPs can be seen as 
driven by a specific goal, namely to be re-authorised as an agent. In both cases, the agents 
have to signal their trustworthiness to their principals to be both re-selected and re-elected. 
Thus, MPs have to satisfy the demands of both their party as well as the electorate. These 
demands, however, are not necessarily compatible. To maintain the trust of their voters, MPs 
need to be seen to fulfil their duties. Only public action can adequately signal trustworthiness 
to the principal. According to Mayhew (1974) they therefore have to focus on three basic 
routines or activities: Advertising (making yourself seen), credit claiming and position taking. 
As an agent of the party, however, parliamentarians need to signal their trustworthiness in 
terms of party loyalty. Such loyalty can be demonstrated in a number of ways, such as reliably 
voting  for/against  government  bills  or  defending/criticising  government  policy  in  public 
debates etc. MPs know that loyal party members are likely to get rewarded, not only with re-
selection, but possibly with an appointment to party office as well, while those who are seen 
to be ‘defecting’ are punished (Cox & McCubbins 1993: 91). And while MPs from both 
governing and opposition parties have to demonstrate trustworthiness to their parties, these 
demands are greater on former. As the stability and effectiveness of the government depends 
on  the  support  of  their  parliamentary  majority,  MPs  from  the  governing  party/parties  are 
generally  expected  to  behave  in  a  way  that  will  not  jeopardise  either:  ‘support  for  a 
government of one’s own becomes the most important task of the governing parliamentary 
majority. Of course, this task can be fulfilled successfully only if the members act a reliable 
group and not as a gathering of individuals that arrive at collective action generally on a case-
by-case basis’ (Patzelt 2000: 23-4, italics in original). Most importantly, it rules out public 
behaviour  that  may  hurt  the  party  or  its  interests  and  undermine  the  trust  between  the 
government and its supporting parliamentary party group(s).  
MPs as Principals 
As argued above, delegation to an agent usually comes with the danger that the agent does 
not faithfully act in the best interest of the principal, i.e. with agency loss. Agency loss is the 
difference between the actual consequence of delegation and what the consequence would 
have been had the agent perfectly realised the principal’s interests (Lupia 2003: 35). The most 
fundamental preference of any principal in such a relationship is therefore to induce her agent 
to act as much in accordance with her interests as possible, in other words, to minimise 
agency loss.  As  Bergman  et  al.  argue,  agency  loss  among  cabinet  members  can  come  in  different 
guises:  ‘It  is  widely  known  from  the  scandal  sheets  and  anecdotal  evidence  (though  not 
extensively  documented  in  the  academic  literature)  that  cabinet  members  often  gratify 
themselves with fancy cars and living quarters, use government airplanes for private trips, 
host unnecessarily lavish receptions, or make other inappropriate uses of government money’ 
(Bergman et al. 2003: 146). Here, I am not interested in the ‘bitter fruits of leisure shirking 
and rent-seeking’ (ibid.), but in agency loss in terms of government policy. While the re-
authorisation goal may be the most important preference of MPs, policy interests cannot be 
completely  ignored.  The  purely  vote-seeking  approach  has  been  criticised  for  being  too 
parsimonious, as ‘not totally persuasive as primitive assumptions. It makes little sense to 
assume that parties [as well as MPs, K.A.] value votes for their own sake … votes can only 
plausibly be instrumental goals’ to achieve policy influence and/or the spoils of office (Strøm 
and Mueller 1999: 9). As Budge and Laver (1986) argue, politicians do pursue policy goals, 
either intrinsically, because they genuinely/sincerely care about the policies in question, or 
instrumentally, as a means for some other goal, for example electoral support. De Swann puts 
it even more forcefully: ‘considerations of policy are foremost in the mind of actors … the 
parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of major government policy’ (De 
Swann 1973: 88). We also cannot assume that common party membership of MPs and cabinet 
ministers simply rules out conflicting interests between principals and agents, thus solving the 
agency problem. While it will indeed reduce agency problems compared to situations where 
agents are randomly chosen, parties are not monolithic, but include a range of positions on 
most policy dimensions and issues (Müller 2000: 320-1). We can therefore expect MPs to 
have an interest in minimising agency loss in terms of the differences between government 
policy and their own policy preferences. 
But agency loss not only refers to policy interests. Following March and Olsen, we can 
distinguish between two logics of human behaviour, a ‘logic of consequentiality’ and a ‘logic 
of  appropriateness’.  The  former  ‘demands  that  political  actors  be  accountable  for  the 
consequences of their action’, while according to the latter such action ‘is assessed as proper 
less because of its consequences than because of its consistency with cultural and political 
norms  and  rules’  (March  and  Olsen  1995:  154).  Applying  the  distinction  to  the  agency 
relationship we can therefore distinguish between two forms of agency loss: The logic of 
consequence relates to potential agency loss in terms of the agent’s (the government’s) policy 
(output and outcome), while the logic of appropriateness relates to agency loss in term of the 
agent’s compliance with accepted norms and rules of the political process.  
Managing the role-set  
So  far  I  have  argued  that  a  model  of  legislative  roles  in  parliamentary  systems  of 
government has to take into account the different relationships associated with the role-set of 
the  status  ‘MP’.  These  relationships  relate  legislators  to  their  voters,  their  party  and  the 
government. In the two former relationships the MP is an agent, in the latter the MP is the 
principal.  All  three  come  with  different  preferences.  As  agents,  MPs’  most  important 
preference is to secure the continuation of the delegation relationship (re-authorisation), i.e. to 
be re-selected/re-nominated as the agent of their party and to be re-elected by the voters. In both cases the agent has to prove or at least signal trustworthiness to his principals for the 
delegation to continue. As principals, the most important preference is to induce their agent 
(the government) to act in accordance with their interests, i.e. to minimise agency loss.  
I  agree  with  Strøm  that  these  different  preferences  are  hierarchically  ordered  with  the 
preference of re-authorisation as agent being more important than the preference MPs have as 
the  principal  of  the  government.  After  all,  becoming  an  agent  is  the  precondition  for 
becoming the principal. However, this does not necessarily imply that agents concentrate on 
either role in a sequential manner, i.e. try to secure re-authorisation before they engage in 
minimising agency loss. Hierarchy rather means that MPs will act as principals with a firm 
eye on their preferences as agents. As principals, MPs will therefore choose strategies of 
minimising  agency  loss  that  will  advance,  or  at  least  not  hurt,  the  realisation  of  their 
preferences as agents. In their roles as agents of the voters, it will therefore be rational for 
MPs to choose public strategies of minimising agency loss. This will signal to the voters that 
the MP is doing the job of representing his or her voters and of controlling the government 
effectively. However, as agent of the party, it may be far more rational – at least for MPs from 
the governing party/parties - to choose private strategies of minimising agency loss, in other 
words, to control the government behind closed doors, to avoid embarrassing the government 
publicly and undermining their own trustworthiness as an agent: ‘Undertaking aggressively 
the task of scrutiny – asking awkward questions, pressing ministers to do that which they do 
not wish to do, threatening to vote against the government in order to achieve an outcome not 
desired by party leaders – may undermine the political credibility of the governing party or 
parties’ (Norton 1998: 194).  
Reality is, of course, slightly messy, and MPs rarely, if ever, fall into either category – 
purely agent of the voters or their party - as their continued position as agents usually depends 
on both the re-selection/re-nomination by their party and the re-election through the voters. 
Thus, ‘if members have some uncertainty about their prospects of reaching any one of their 
objectives and these are not fully hierarchically ordered, they may think of their strategic 
choices  as  trade-offs  under  risk’  (Strøm  1997:  161).  However,  MPs  operate  within  an 
institutional  context  that  provides  both  constraints  and  incentives  regarding  the  choice  of 
strategies.  The  choice  of  strategies  regarding  their  re-authorisation  as  agents  will  be 
influenced in large part by the electoral system and the extent to which it emphasises the 
importance of personal votes.  
The  literature  on  personal  voting  agrees  that  the  importance  of  both  candidate 
considerations (from the perspective of the voter) as well as personalised electoral strategies 
(from the perspective of the candidate) depend on the electoral system. Cox and Rosenbluth, 
for  example  measure  the  electoral  importance  of  parties  in  terms  of  their  electoral 
cohesiveness  by  which  they  mean  ‘the  extent  to  which  the  electoral  fates  of  incumbent 
candidates of the same party are tied together. Electoral cohesiveness in high when what 
happens to the party’s incumbents as a whole is a good predictor of what will happen to any 
one  of  them;  it  is  low  when  collective  and  individual  fates  are  dissociated’  (Cox  and 
Rosenbluth 1995: 19, italics in original). Carey and Shugart (1995) rank electoral systems 
according to their tendencies to create personal vote incentives based on the four variables 
vote type (one or more votes, for party or candidate), vote pooling, ballot control and district magnitude. Personal characteristics of a candidate are least important in systems where voters 
can only cast one vote for a party, when pooling is at the party level, when parties have full 
ballot control and the district magnitude in large. As Hallerberg (2004: 22) or Mitchell (2000) 
show, most West European electoral systems de-emphasise the importance of the personal 
vote: ‘in many European countries the electoral laws provide very little scope for voters to 
impose direct (and especially terminal) sanctions on MPs. Thus, in closed list systems or even 
in formally preferential cases in which the default rank order is very difficult to overturn, the 
direction of delegation is essentially from voters to parties, so that MPs are primarily agents 
of  their  respective  parties’  (Mitchell  2000:  348).  Bergman  et  al.  (2003)  provide  a 
comprehensive overview over the electoral connection between voters and MPs. Although 
they concede that the potential effects of preference voting are greater, the actual effects they 
have observed lead them to similar conclusions: ‘Although PR electoral systems increasingly 
allow for intra-party preference voting, this trend is by no means overwhelmingly strong. 
Moreover, in practice, relatively few MPs owe their seats in parliament to this instrument. 
This is in part because intra-party preference voting allows voters only to reward, but not 
punish,  candidates.  Thus  …  the  effects  of  preference  voting  range  from  insignificant  to 
modest’ (Bergman et al. 2003: 136). 
This does not mean, of course, that the party is the only relevant principal of MPs. Even 
under a completely party dominated electoral system, parties still need to be voted for by the 
electorate to gain office. Yet for many, if not most, MPs, nomination by the party as well as 
the overall electoral success of the party rather than their own profile will determine whether 
or not they will (re-) gain office. In addition, even in more personalised systems, there may be 
a  potential  tension  between  the  incentives  of  individual  candidates  and  the  collective 
incentives of the party as a whole (Cox and McCubbins 1993; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 
1995). Thus, parties and their leadership need to ensure that individual candidate behaviour 
does not harm the collective electoral fate of the party, and we can expect them to constrain 
behaviour that poses a potential threat to the party’s interest (Swindle 2002: 282). Finally, 
since parliamentary systems of government are characterised by interdependence between the 
government and the governing parliamentary party groups, we cannot expect MPs from the 
governing party/parties to hurt or disregard their party’s interests. 
But what exactly are the strategies that MPs as principals of the government can employ to 
rein in their agents? The literature on delegation identifies three main measures or instruments 
principals  can  use  to  minimise  agency  loss:  (1)  screening  and  selection  mechanisms,  (2) 
contract  design,  and  (3)  oversight  (monitoring  and  reporting  requirements  as  well  as 
sanctions) (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991, Strøm 2000: 271).
5 Screening and selection are ex 
ante  mechanisms  that  aim  at  reducing  hidden  information  with  regard  to  the  agent’s 
preferences and skills and thus at avoiding adverse selection. Thus, the aim is to identify the 
good and the bad agents before delegating to them, in other words, ‘to eliminate potentially 
                                                        
5   Kiewiet  and  McCubbins  also  mention  a  fourth  instrument,  institutional  checks,  which  subject 
particularly critical agent decisions to the veto powers of other agents or a third party. Such institutional 
checks  are  more  common  in  presidential  systems  due  to  their  separation  of  powers  than  in 
parliamentary systems (Strøm 2000: 271-3), but federalism or Constitutional Courts can present such 
checks here as well.  troublesome cabinet members before they ever get into office’ (Strøm 1995: 75). Contract 
design is another ex ante mechanism. Contracts set down the rules for the delegation as a 
whole, such as an employment contact or, in our case, the legal framework for legislative-
executive  relations  laid  down  in  the  constitution,  secondary  legislation  and  parliamentary 
Standing Orders. Principals can design the contract establishing the delegation in a way that 
provides  the  agent  with  incentives  to  act  in  closer  accordance  with  her  interests.  Classic 
examples are incentives such as profit sharing, where the payoff of the agent will increase the 
more he manages to increase the payoff of the principal.  
Monitoring and reporting requirements, in contrast, are usually seen as ex post measures of 
parliamentary oversight. Once the delegation has taken place, the principal can oblige the 
agent to regularly report on his actions, or the agent can try to monitor her agent’s actions 
herself. Depending on the outcome, the principal can also use sanctions to punish or reward 
the agent for the outcome of his actions. In other words, the principal can hold the agent 
accountable.
6 In the following, I will focus on such measures of accountability, rather than 
screening  or  contract  design.  Screening/election  and  contract  design  are  well-established 
mechanisms in parliamentary democracies (Strøm 2000). On the one hand, however, I am 
interested in how MPs try to control their given government with regard to very specific tasks, 
namely negotiations at the European level. Ministers are generally responsible for a large 
portfolio, which will include both domestic and EU policies within their policy fields. Thus, 
although Parliament may choose Ministers also with regard to their EU-competence
7, once 
they are chosen, the contract will include EU responsibilities as well. Parliaments cannot and 
do not choose a new agent for every negotiation in the Council. Contract design, on the other 
hand, here refers to the institutional framework of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
Yet  as  argued  earlier,  I  am  not  interested  in  explaining  the  existence  of  or  variation  in 
institutional provisions but in variation in parliamentary behaviour. In the following, I will 
therefore concentrate on the use of measures of parliamentary oversight in European affairs.  
Delegation and Accountability in European Affairs 
With the process of European integration the parliamentary chain of delegation has been 
extended to the European level. Yet European integration has not just added another link to 
the chain, but has fundamentally altered the chain of delegation in the parliamentary systems 
of Europe (Auel 2008). First, European integration has led to the delegation of agenda setting 
power to an external actor, namely the European Commission. As such, the delegation of 
policy initiation competences is nothing new in parliamentary systems where agents usually 
set the agenda while the principal can agree, amend or reject this proposal. What is different 
in EU policies, however, is the fact that policies are not initiated on the basis of a manifesto 
                                                        
6   Lupia (2000: 18-9) distinguishes between two interpretations of accountability, as a process and as an 
outcome. The former refers to the process of holding the agent accountable, the latter to the degree of 
control the principal can exert over her agents. Lupia uses accountability to refer to a type of outcome, 
rather than a process of control. As a result agency loss and accountability are basically the same. In 
contrast, I am using accountability to refer to the process of holding the agent accountable, and thus as 
only one instrument of reducing agency loss.  
7   This is, of course, especially the case if ‘Europe/EU’ is a specific portfolio.  agreed upon or policy aims shared by the Cabinet and the governing party/parties, but by an 
external actor who is not accountable to the national legislature. As a result, agenda setting is 
no longer delegated to a carefully screened and selected agent but to an actor over whom the 
legislature has no direct control.
8 Secondly, European integration entails the delegation of 
legislation in the sense of both, policy-making and giving final approval to bills. National 
parliaments are not directly involved in the policy-making at the European level and can 
therefore have only a mediated input. More importantly, parliaments also lose their right to 
make  the  final  decision  on  secondary  legislation.  Only  primary  EU  legislation  (Treaty 
revisions)  has  to  be  ratified  domestically  either  through  a  parliamentary  decision  or  a 
referendum.  Depending  on  the  type  of  secondary  EU  legislation,  national  parliaments  do 
retain  a  possibility  to  amend  or  delay  European  legislation  through  the  transposition  of 
European directives, but in the end member states are forced to comply with EU law. This 
leads  to  the  third  type  of  delegation,  namely  the  delegation  of  supervision  functions.  In 
addition to its monopoly of legislative initiative, the Commission acts as the guardian of 
European  law  and  supervises  the  implementation  of  European  legislation  by  the  member 
states. Thus, the direction of the chain of delegation is actually reversed, making the EU 
(through the European Commission) the principal who entrusts to the implementation of EU 
legislation to its agents, the member states. The EU as the principal can also, through the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, sanction non-compliance more or 
less effectively (Tallberg 2003). In all of these cases, European integration entails a process of 
transfer of power to actors, who are not accountable to national parliaments and who cannot 
be controlled by national parliaments. It is therefore be more fitting to speak of an abdication 
of power. The European Commission cannot be held accountable or sanctioned by national 
parliaments (although the member states do, of course, retain some control, Franchino 2002), 
and the European Parliament is accountable to the European voters.  
Finally,  each  parliament  delegates  decision-making  powers  to  its  representative  in  the 
Council, who in turn is accountable to parliament. This is the only intact chain of delegation 
including  national  parliaments  as  a  link.  In  reaction  to  these  challenges  of  European 
integration, all national parliaments have designed specific ‘contracts’ with their governments 
that detail scrutiny processes in EU affairs. These contracts include the right to receive more 
or less comprehensive information on European issues from their government. While this 
right at first applied mainly to the ‘first pillar’ of the EU, it was later expanded to the ‘second’ 
and  ‘third  pillar’  in  most  national  parliaments.  Secondly,  they  implemented  scrutiny 
procedures for European documents and decisions. This usually includes the right to draft 
resolutions in European issues and documents before a final decision is made in the Council 
(‘scrutiny  reserve’).  In  this  respect,  however,  the  institutional  reforms  vary  considerably, 
ranging from the right to issue binding voting instructions for the government representative 
in the Council to mere information rights with few means of influence. Between these two 
extremes, quite a few parliaments have the formal right to express their views without being 
                                                        
8   Note, however, that 2007 Lisbon Treaty’s ‘Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality’ gives national parliaments collectively, if a certain threshold is reached, the right to 
demand  that  the  European  Commission  re-examine  a  legislative  draft  act  they  deem  to  breach  the 
subsidiarity principle and thus potential influence on European agenda setting. For an assessment of the 
provision see Raunio 2007. able to bind their government to their resolutions. Finally, in order to make the handling of 
information as well as the scrutiny procedures more effective, they set up one or more special 
European Affairs Committees (EAC).
9 
Parliamentary Oversight in EU Affairs 
The institutional provisions outlined above were designed to enabled national parliaments 
to  exert  parliamentary  oversight  over  European  affairs  and  to  hold  the  government 
accountable  for  its  European  policies.  Accountability  means  being  answerable  for  one’s 
actions  to  some  authority  and  having  to  suffer  sanctions  for  those  actions.  Thus,  ‘A  is 
accountable  to  B  when  A  is  obliged  to  inform  B  about  A’s  (past  or  future)  actions  and 
decisions,  to  justify  them,  and  to  suffer  punishment  in  the  case  of  eventual  misconduct’ 
(Schedler 1999: 17). Similarly, Bovens defines accountability as ‘a relationship between an 
actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct,  the  forum  can  pose  questions  and  pass  judgment,  and  the  actor  may  face 
consequences’  (Bovens  2007:  450,  italics  in  original).  Elsewhere  I  have  argued  that 
accountability as a relationship between a principal and an agent therefore implies a three-step 
process  of  a)  obtaining  information  on  the  agent’s  actions  and  b)  an  assessment  of  and 
judgement on these actions leading c) to potential sanctions. On this basis, we can draw a 
distinction between ‘monitoring scrutiny’ and ‘political scrutiny’ of governmental action as 
two elements of parliamentary accountability (Auel 2008). In a first stage, the agent is obliged 
to inform the principal about his (planned)
10 behaviour and actions, by providing information 
on the performance of tasks, on procedures and (intended) outcomes. Here, this ‘monitoring 
scrutiny’, refers to the context of decision-making (the European issue or legislative proposal 
under negotiation, its potential effects on domestic policies) as well as the specific decision 
(to be) taken by the government representative (the government’s negotiation position and the 
reasons for adopting it). ‘Political scrutiny’, on the other hand, involves the second stage of 
assessment and political judgement on the government’s decision and the respective outcome 
of European negotiations.  
As  argued  above,  we  can  also  distinguish  between  two  subjects  of  accountability  that 
follow  two  logics  of  human  behaviour,  a  ‘logic  of  consequentiality’  and  a  ‘logic  of 
appropriateness’. Applying this distinction to the scrutiny of the government’s EU policy-
making, we can differentiate between the outcome of the negotiations in the Council and the 
way  the  government  has  conducted  itself  before  and  during  the  negotiations.  The  former 
includes both the initial position adopted by the government as well as the result achieved in 
the negotiations (logic of consequentiality). The latter concerns the question in how far the 
government  respects  the  rules  and  norms  of  the  parliamentary  game  (logic  of 
                                                        
9   For cross-national comparisons of these institutional provisions, or contracts, see Maurer and Wessels 
2001 and O’Brennan and Raunio 2007.  
10   According to some definitions, both elements of accountability are necessarily reactive: one is called to 
account after the fact (e.g. Bovens 1998: 27). Ex post it fulfils the function of finding out what went 
wrong  and  dealing  with  it  accordingly.  Yet  ex  ante  accountability  is  important  as  well,  because 
‘receiving  someone’s  account  on  his  or  her  acts  while  being  in  office  and  [evaluating]  those  acts 
presupposes at least some knowledge about what he or she had promised to do’ (Puntscher Riekmann 
2007: 126). appropriateness). In this case, the assessment of the government’s behaviour refers to the 
respect  for  specific  rules  regarding  parliamentary  involvement.  In  other  words,  under 
evaluation is whether the government has complied with the parliamentary rules, for example 
with regard to the provision of information (comprehensive and in time) and the scrutiny 
reserve  and  whether  it  has  taken  due  notice  of  parliamentary  opinion  (depending  on  the 
binding character of such opinions). 
Finally,  to  quote  Behn  (2001:  3),  agents  ‘recognize  that  if  someone  is  holding  them 
accountable, two things can happen: When they do something good, nothing happens. But 
when they screw up, all hell can break loose. … Accountability means punishment.’ Holding 
an agent accountable without any means of sanctioning potential wrongdoing could be argued 
to be rather ineffective as the agent does not have to fear any negative consequences. As 
Yannis Papadopoulos argues, ‘the more decision-makers feel that they act in the shadow of 
possible sanctions, the more it will be rational for them to endogenise the preferences of their 
“principal”’ (Papadopoulos 2007: 472). Generally, principals dispose of three potential types 
of  sanctions  (Strøm  2003:  62).  First,  they  can  sack  the  agent.  This  is  the  most  powerful 
sanction national parliaments have at their disposal, namely the ultimate de-authorisation of 
their agent through a vote of no confidence, but it is a blunt and very costly instrument and 
therefore not likely to be used except in exceptional circumstances (for a discussion see Huber 
1996b;  Laver  and  Shepsle  1998;  Lupia  and  Strøm  1995).  More  effective  is  therefore  the 
second option of vetoing or amending decisions or actions of the agent (e.g. non-ratification 
or amendment of government bills). Finally, MPs have other potential instruments at their 
disposal, which they can use as – albeit much weaker - sanctions. Meny and Knapp therefore 
referred to these instruments as ‘unsanctioned’ control mechanisms (Meny and Knapp 1998: 
208-11). Yet although they are far less spectacular than the de-authorisation of an agent or a 
parliamentary veto, they can be important mechanisms to reduce agency loss. It has been 
argued, for example, that the very fact of having to render account can serve as a sanction 
(Bovens 2007: 452). Obliging Ministers to defend their policy decisions in parliamentary 
hearings and debates or to answer critical parliamentary questions can put them in a very 
uncomfortable situation since they can be forced to admit inconvenient or embarrassing facts. 
And if Ministers are caught trying to hide such facts and lying to parliament, MPs may be 
able  to  use  more  forceful  sanctions,  for  example  by  convicting  them:  ‘At  least  in  some 
countries it is a long-standing convention that ministers who have been proven guilty in this 
respect have to resign or be dismissed by the head of government (Bergman et al. 2003: 168 
with further references). We can therefore expect the threat of such sanctions to have some 
impact in terms of reducing agency loss as well. 
In the following I will focus on the latter two options and argue that MPs will choose 
strategies that yield maximum reduction of agency loss relative to its cost. This is based on 
the argument that the sanctions MPs have at their disposal not only differ with regard to their 
impact in terms of reducing agency loss, but also with regard to the costs involved. Both are 
influenced by the institutional context. First, the institutional provisions for scrutiny in EU 
affairs have an impact on the type of sanctions national parliaments have at their disposal. 
Second, the broader institutional context influences how credibly they can threaten to use 
them  and  how  powerful  these  sanctions  are.  Third,  institutional  provisions  also  have  an impact on the costs associated with the use of different sanction. The institutional context thus 
provides MPs with different opportunities of minimising agency loss that will have different 
payoffs.  
The impact of Sanctions 
The argument starts with the most basic model of delegation developed by Romer and 
Rosenthal (1978). The discussion draws heavily on Lupia (2000), but uses the model in a 
slightly different way. In the model, delegation is a game between two players, the principal 
and the agent. The principal (Parliament, MPs) has delegated the general task of conducting 
EU  politics  to  her  agent  (the  government,  or,  more  precisely,  government  minister).  The 
specific game discussed here refers to the situation where a European legislative proposal is 
under discussion in the Council. For the sake of simplicity, we will for now assume the 
following three conditions: 
1)  Information in complete. 
2)  Principal and agent behave rationally. They will have given preferences about what the 
outcome of their interaction should be. Both seeks to maximise a single-peaked utility 
function, i.e. their ideal policy. 
3)  The decision taken by the agent is the final decision at the EU level. This assumption 
grossly simplifies reality, of course, as the decision at the European level will depend on 
the original proposal of the Commission, the preferences of the other Council members 
and the decision making procedure (unanimity or QMV) as well as the preference and 
type of involvement of the European Parliament. However, the simple model will be 
sufficient for the moment.  
The sequence of events in the Romer-Rosenthal model is depicted in Figure 2. The agent 
moves first by using his delegated authority to make a decision.  In our case, this can be 
thought of as the proposal for a specific decision in the Council. Formally, the agent's action 
can be portrayed as proposing a new EU policy, X ∈ [0, 1]. This policy is an alternative to the 
reversion  point,  RP  ∈  [0,  1]  (that  is,  the  pre-existing  domestic  policy  status  quo).  The 
principal then either accepts the agent's proposal or rejects it in favour of maintaining the 
reversion point (that is, she chooses X or RP). ( Lupia 2000: 19). 
Figure 2  A Simple Model of Delegation 
 
Source: Lupia 2000: 20 The principal’s ideal policy in this model is P ∈ [0, 1], and the agent’s ideal policy is A ∈ 
[0, 1]. Principal and agent each prefer the outcome of the interaction or game to be as close as 
possible to their own ideal policy outcome. As Lupia demonstrates, the model reveals four 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive situations (Figure 3). In each situation, the 
relationship between the principal's ideal policy, the agent's ideal policy and the reversion 
point differs. In Situation 1, the principal and agent have identical ideal policies. The agent 
proposes the principal's (and the agent's) ideal policy and the principal accepts the agent's 
proposal. As a result, there is no agency loss. In Situations 2 and 3, the principal and the agent 
agree on the desired direction of policy change but not on the magnitude of such change. 
They  differ,  however,  in  the  distance  between  the  principal’s  ideal  policy  point  to  the 
reversion point relative to the distance between the principals ideal policy and the agent’s 
ideal policy. In both versions of Situation 2, the agent can safely propose his own ideal policy 
point as this is still closer to the principal’s ideal policy point than the reversion point. 
Figure 3  Possible Situations in the Simple Model of Delegation 
 
In Situation 3 however, the principal’s ideal policy is closer to the reversion point than it is 
to the agent’s ideal policy. This means that the principal would rather maintain the reversion 
point than accept the agent's ideal policy. Since the agent knows this, he will not propose his 
ideal policy but choose the policy closest to his own ideal policy that the principal will accept. 
In  Situation  4,  the  principal's  and  the  agent's  ideal  policies  are  on  opposite  sides  of  the 
reversion point. In this situation there is no alternative to the reversion point that is mutually 
agreeable to the principal and the agent.  
As the model demonstrates, a veto right is an effective instrument of minimising agency 
loss, although it cannot reduce agency loss to zero and the reduction depends on the ideal 
policies of both players. Yet, the model is only partly helpful for our purposes. To make it 
applicable to the case of national parliaments in EU affairs, a number of alterations have to be made to the model. These alterations refer to 1) the assumption that the proposal of the agent 
is equal to the final decision at the European level, and 2) the assumption that principals have 
nothing more and nothing less than veto power. Although also wildly unrealistic, we will keep 
the assumption of complete information for the moment.  
First, even if we ignore the role of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
in the decision-making process, decisions at the EU level are made by a collective body, the 
Council.  If  the  agent’s  ideal  policy  point  differs  from  those  of  the  other  members,  the 
intervention of the agent in this collective body will therefore have an impact on the decision 
in the Council, but will not determine it.
11 This has important implications for the veto power 
of the principal. One the one hand, this situation differs from classic two-level-games insofar 
as the principal cannot veto a decision in the Council ex post. Once a final decision has been 
taken at the European level member states become effectively agents of the EU and are in turn 
accountable for the implementation of European decisions.
12 On the other hand, since national 
parliaments are not themselves involved in decision-making at the European level, they can 
only veto the proposal or negotiation position of their agent ex ante, and thus the position of 
only one single actor within this collective body, but not the decision of the Council itself. To 
veto  a  decision  in  the  Council,  parliament  has  to  instruct  the  agent  to  veto  a  Council 
decision.
13 This distinction is important because it has implications for the definition of the 
reversion point. Above we assumed that the proposal of the agent is equal to the final decision 
of the Council. The reversion point was therefore the domestic status quo. If the final decision 
is, however, made by a collective body, and the principal can only become involved ex ante 
(but not ex post), vetoing the agent’s proposal will not automatically result in a return to the 
domestic  status  quo.  Rather  the  reversion  point  is  the  decision  that  will  be  made  in  the 
Council without any intervention by the agent. This only equals the status quo if negotiations 
in the Council fail, for example due to a veto under unanimity.  
This brings us to the second alteration to the model: As Lupia emphasises elsewhere, the 
Romer-Rosenthal model's predictions depend heavily on the assumption ‘that the principal 
can only accept or reject the agent's action. If the principal is given greater powers relative to 
the agent (i.e. she can force the agent to take actions closer to P), then agency loss will 
                                                        
11   The only case where the agent’s position can determine the Council’s decision is if he vetoes a decision 
under unanimity. Under unanimity, an agent will not be able to enforce a specific decision against the 
will of the other Council members, and under QMV agent’s can – at least in theory - be outvoted. 
12   Where EU legislation has to be transposed by national parliaments into domestic law, they have at least 
some leeway to amend legislation to domestic needs. But where national parliaments are not involved in 
the transposition of EU law at all, because it is directly applicable or domestic rules provide for a 
transposition through executive decree, they lose this instrument completely. 
13   In the first case, the principal vetoes the agent’s proposal for the negotiation position in the Council. As 
a result, the agent will not be able to negotiate on this or indeed any basis. In the second case, the 
principal prefers the domestic status quo to the decision that will be made in the Council. She will 
therefore have to instruct her agent to veto this decision. Vetoing the negotiation position therefore is 
equal to the de-authorisation for a specific negotiation. Instructing the agent to veto a council decision, 
in  contrast,  is  an  authorisation  or  mandate  to  act  in  a  specific  way.  The  example  of  the  Danish 
parliament is instructive to demonstrate the difference. The Danish European Affairs Committee has the 
right  to  mandate  the  government’s  negotiation  position.  Usually  it  uses  its  right  to  instruct  the 
government on what to achieve in the Council negotiations. However, very rarely the Committee also 
refuses to give the Minister any kind of mandate. As a result, the Danish representative in the Council 
cannot agree to any decision made in the Council, but has to abstain (Auel and Benz 2005: 384). decrease. Similarly, if the principal is given lesser power relative to the agent (i.e. she cannot 
reject agent actions), agency loss will increase’ (Lupia 2003: 40).  And indeed, only a very 
small minority of national parliaments have a formal right to veto or amend (mandate) their 
government’s position in EU affairs. For most parliaments, the distinction between veto as de-
authorisation and authorisation to veto is therefore of little importance, since they only have a 
formal right to express their views on a European decision under negotiation without being 
able to bind their government legally to their resolutions. The extent to which their opinions 
are politically binding for the agent, however, varies considerably. Taking Philip Norton’s 
distinction,  some  parliaments  can  characterised  as  strong  or  moderate  policy  influencers, 
some are legislatures with little or no policy affect (Norton 1994).  
Figure 4 outlines the same four situations as above, but introduces the two alterations 
discussed  above  (reversion  point  is  decision  made  in  Council  without  agent  intervention 
[RCC],  principal  has  greater/lesser  power  than  veto).  As  the  figure  demonstrates,  if  the 
principal has the additional power to amend the agent’s proposal, the agent will propose a 
policy closer to her ideal policy than under the pure veto [*M]. This is illustrated in Figure 4 
as the game below the lines. In situations 2 to 4 this will lead to less or even zero agency loss 
(indicated by the broken arrows). 
Figure 4  Possible Situations in the Adapted Model of Delegation  
 
RPC denotes the decision that will be made in the council without intervention by the agent, *I denotes the 
agent’s negotiation position if the principal does not have a veto, *M the agent’s negotiation position if the 
principal does have a veto.  
 However, if the principal has no veto right, the agent has no incentive to propose anything 
other than his original ideal policy point [*I], since the principal cannot sanction him by 
rejecting any proposal. It is thus rational for the agent to completely ignore the ideal policy 
point of his principal, and agency loss increases. This is illustrated in the situation above the 
lines.  In  reality,  and  in  deviation  from  the  pure  rationality  assumption,  however,  we  can 
assume  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  governments  to  ignore  their  parliaments  completely, 
especially if parliamentary opinions are voiced publicly or they have to fear being subjected 
to  uncomfortable  parliamentary  questioning.  We  can  therefore  assume  that  such  weaker 
sanctions will induce the agent to move his proposal at least somewhat towards the ideal 
policy of the principal (illustrated by the shorter continuous arrows).  
The Costs of Parliamentary Sanctions 
As  the  discussion  above  demonstrates,  parliamentary  sanctions  differ  decisively  with 
regard to their impact in terms of reducing agency loss. However, so far, the discussion has 
been based on the wholly unrealistic assumption of complete information. A problem inherent 
in delegation in general, and in the empirical circumstances of EU politics, in particular, is 
information asymmetry. As argued above, principals often lack information on the concrete 
circumstances of the task to fulfil (hidden information) and information on the agent’s actions 
(hidden action). This is certainly the case in EU affairs. Since negotiations in the Council are 
not  really  transparent
14,  national  parliaments  lack  both,  information  on  the  negotiation 
positions of the other member states’ representatives (and thus on the reversion point) and on 
the actions of their agent. While they may have information on decision under negotiation as 
well as the negotiation position their agent proposes, they don’t know whether the agent will 
really  pursue  this  position  in  the  Council  or  amend  it,  and  they  don’t  know  how  this 
negotiation  position  will  affect  the  final  decision  in  the  Council.  As  Lupia  demonstrates, 
under incomplete information principals therefore run the risk of making decisions that will 
hurt their interests: ‘In the worst case, the principal's uncertainty leads her to make mistakes - 
to reject agent actions that would benefit her and accept agent actions that hurt her’ (Lupia 
2000: 24). Consider, for example, a situation in which parliament as the principal has the 
power  to  bind  the  agent  to  a  specific  negotiation  position.  If  the  Council  decides  under 
unanimity, binding the agent to a specific negotiation position may lead to the failure of the 
negotiations and thus to the failure of a decision that may have been closer to the principal’s 
ideal policy than the status quo. Under QMV, an agent whose negotiation position is not 
within the win-set in the Council can simply be outvoted without being able to influence the 
final outcome and thus achieving a result closer to the principal’s ideal policy (on QMV 
                                                        
14   Despite a number of reforms regarding the access to Council documents (Héritier 2003: 823) decision-
making in the Council (and especially in the Council’s working groups and COREPER) still takes place 
mainly behind closed doors. In addition, it is being argued that a degree of secrecy is vital to ensure 
effective Council negotiations. Only if negotiating partners are no longer subject to the pressures of 
public  deliberation  can  the  advantages  of  direct  communication  materialise  and  prior  positions  be 
overcome. Thus, if the Council were to deliberate in public, decisions would either be blocked ‘because 
delegations would be forced to take an immovable position, or the public proceedings would be theatre, 
with the real business being done by officials behind closed doors’ (Curtin 1996). Opening ‘the final 
legislative stages to public purview will only force the real political bargaining behind the next set of 
closed doors’ (Lord 1998: 88). voting in the Council see Mattila 2004 with further references). Without going into further 
detail, we can conclude that under incomplete information mandating the agent’s proposal 
may  be  risky.  To  reduce  this  risk,  principals  therefore  need  information  not  only  on  the 
actions of their agent, but also on the negotiation situation, i.e. the positions of the other 
member states’ representatives: ‘What matters is whether or not the principal knows enough 
to wield whatever power she may have over the agent effectively’ (Lupia 2000: 24, italics in 
original). Yet even if national parliaments do not have a veto right, but can only draft a 
resolution  on  a  European  document,  they  need  such  information  to  be  able  to  give  an 
informed  opinion  if  they  want  to  have  any  influence.  Acquiring  such  information  is  not 
impossible, but may be extremely costly. MPs will only invest scarce resources to acquire the 
information necessary to make an effective decision if they have a reasonable expectation that 
their intervention will be successful in altering their agents proposal, in other words, that their 
use will actually result in a (substantial) reduction of agency loss.  
Unsurprisingly, if parliaments have formal amending (mandating) power, the decrease in 
agency  loss  is  greatest.  Where  they  can  only  state  their  opinion,  the  success  of  their 
intervention  will  depend  in  their  power  to  influence.  For  stronger  policy  influencers,  the 
decision will depend on the cost of acquiring the necessary information in relation to the 
expected benefit. Finally, where this influence is weak or zero, the reduction of agency loss 
will  be  very  low  or  zero  as  well.  In  this  case,  the  cost  of  acquiring  information  clearly 
outweighs the benefits. It is therefore irrational for MPs to use influence as a sanction, and 
they will turn to the less costly sanctions mentioned above such as obliging Ministers to 
defend their policy decisions in parliamentary hearings and debates or compelling them to 
answer critical parliamentary questions.  
In addition, the costs of sanctions in terms of time invested or information needed to make 
them effective will be influenced by the institutional context, as institutional provisions can 
reduce the cost of parliamentary oversight. I am not able to discuss all provisions in detail due 
to space limitations, but a few examples should suffice to illustrate the point. One aspect is, 
for example, to which extent the institutional rules provide national parliaments to the right to 
receive  information  on  EU  affairs  from  their  governments.  The  greater  the  information 
provided by the government, the less time and effort MPs have to invest to obtain sufficient 
information themselves. Domestic legal provisions differ not only with regard to the type of 
documents (only legal or other, only first pillar or other pillars as well) governments have to 
forward to their parliaments, but also whether parliaments have the right to receive additional 
information from the government in form of explanatory memoranda analysing the legal and 
political significance of EU proposals and presenting the governmental position on them.  
In  addition,  costs  can  be  reduced  through  institutionalised  access  to  other  sources  of 
information than the government, for example through institutionalised contacts with MPs 
from other national Parliaments (for example through COSAC) or Members of the European 
Parliament  (e.g.  through  their  membership  or  regular  presence  in  the  European  Affairs 
Committee) as well as the ability to organise hearings with experts or interest groups or the 
establishment of a parliamentary representation in Brussels. Similarly, informal but routine 
contacts to members of other parliaments or European actors can reduce information costs. Such contacts can not only provide additional information, but also reduce the cost by acting 
as ‘fire alarms’ (McCubbins and Schwartz 1986). 
Finally, the costs will also depend on MPs ability to process received information. Here, 
the  number  of  the  number  of  committees  involved  in  European  Affairs  as  well  as  their 
‘jurisdictions’ and the availability of support staff are of importance. While some Parliaments 
have set up only one European Affairs Committee, others have created more committees that 
have different tasks or deal with different European policy areas. The latter does, of course, 
allow for some specialisation within the area of European politics. A similar aspect is the 
involvement of specialised standing committees. In some parliaments, the EAC is the main 
forum  for  dealing  with  European  issues,  with  more  or  less  intensive  cooperation  with  or 
consultation  of  the  specialised  standing  committees.  In  other  parliaments,  the  specialised 
standing  committees  are  responsible  for  the  scrutiny  of  European  issues  in  their  specific 
policy areas. The trade-off between the two options is quite straightforward. European Affairs 
Committees  can  develop  the  necessary  expertise  with  regard  to  the  functioning  of  the 
European political system and decision-making the specialised standing committees might 
lack. In addition, EACs may develop a more integrated view on European issues. On the other 
hand, they have to deal with all European issues that cover a range of policy areas that is 
almost as wide as in domestic politics where a large number of committees and consequently 
a  high  degree  of  specialisation  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  preconditions  for  effective 
parliamentary work (Mattson and Strøm 1995).  
Going public? 
A final question regarding the choice of strategies is whether to use them in public or 
behind closed doors. On the one hand, the impact of the sanctions discussed above clearly 
increases  if  these  sanctions  are  used  in  public.  Non-binding  parliamentary  resolutions,  in 
particular, will have a much greater impact on the government’s negotiation position if made 
publicly, because this will make it more difficult for the government to completely ignore 
them. The same is true for a parliamentary veto or amendment, which, if made publicly, is far 
more difficult for the government to circumvent in the Council negotiations. But publicity is 
probably most important for all weaker sanctions connected to the process of holding the 
government to account, such as parliamentary debates, hearings or questions. While critical 
questioning behind closed doors may be uncomfortable for Ministers, having to defend their 
European policies in public will be much more uncomfortable due to the potential negative 
publicity and public embarrassment.  
On the other hand, using sanctions in public comes at a cost as well. As argued at the 
beginning, MPs are first and foremost agents, of the voters and, more importantly, of their 
party. And while publicly sanctioning the government may serve their interest as agents of the 
voters, it may seriously hurt their more important interests as agents of their party (Auel 
2008). Parliamentary vetoes or public resolutions are sanctions that can only be used by MPs 
from the governing parties, unless, of course, the government is a minority government facing 
an opposition majority in parliament. Using the institutional right of drafting a more or less 
binding resolution therefore means that MPs have to state publicly that they do not share their 
own government’s negotiation position, but instead demand that the government change their position according to parliamentary wishes.
15 The result would be similar to a defeat of a 
governmental bill, namely a public and therefore humiliating opposition to the government by 
its  own  parliamentary  majority.  MPs  usually  have  no  incentive  to  risk  this,  since  it  may 
seriously  undermine  their  own  trustworthiness  in  the  eyes  of  the  party  leaders.  Public 
resolutions make divisions and conflict within the governing party or parties public and, thus, 
vulnerable to exploitation by the opposition, which could easily criticise the government for 
not even winning the support of its own parliamentary majority for its position. Finally, an 
openly  opposing  parliamentary  resolution  might  severely  weaken  the  government’s 
negotiation position in Brussels as other negotiation partners could also easily point out that 
the  government’s  position  is  not  even  supported  at  home.  As  a  consequence,  the 
parliamentary majority might be accused of supporting the interests of other Member States’ 
governments.  
Similarly, subjecting the government to uncomfortable and potentially embarrassing public 
questioning can undermine the trust between the government and its supporting MPs and, as a 
result, undermine the MPs trustworthiness in the eyes of their party leaders. We can therefore 
hardly expect MPs supporting the government to engage publicly in assessing and criticising 
their  agent’s  actions  regularly.  Due  to  the  expectation  of  loyalty,  governing  MPs  will 
normally  resort  to  criticising  the  government  in  private  forums  instead.  In  parliamentary 
systems of government public critique is mainly the task of the opposition: ‘By question and 
debate, [the government] is kept under a constant and ceaseless review, where the most trivial 
detail may be fraught with enormous consequences, where the Opposition spends the whole 
time  seeking  the  Executive’s  weak  point,  and  having  once  found  it,  has  boundless 
opportunities  to  hammer  and  hammer  away,  constantly  keeping  it  before  the  public  eye’ 
(Finer  1957:  143).  However,  even  MPs  from  the  governing  party/parties  may  be  more 
prepared to punish the government for improper conduct (‘logic of appropriateness’) and thus 
in cases where the government has breached parliamentary scrutiny rights, with regard to 
incomplete or late information, the failure to take parliamentary opinions into account, or for 
the failure to involve parliament at all before making a decision in the Council. In such cases, 
where the prestige or dignity of parliament is at stake (‘institutional patriotism’, Matthews 
1960)  executive-legislative  relations  may  indeed  follow  a  ‘non-party  mode’  (King  1976), 
‘where  a  unified  parliamentary  principal  holds  the  agent  to  account  for  his  behaviour’ 
(Damgaard 2000: 15).  
                                                        
15   A public parliamentary resolution can, of course, also be drafted in accordance with the government’s 
position. The aim, then, is not so much to influence the government’s negotiation position, but rather to 
support  that  position  in  order  to  strengthen  the  government’s  bargaining  power  in  the  Brussels 
negotiations. In turn, the government can, of course, use a public parliamentary resolution or mandate to 
bind its hands strategically in the Council negotiations. This situation, however, again presupposes an 
agreement  between  government  and  its  parliamentary  majority  in  which  the  government  uses 
parliament to strengthen its own position (Auel 2008). Conclusion 
‘Rational-choice  theory  can  help  to  generate  general,  parsimonious  models  on  the 
mechanisms of parliamentary politics which can be tested against a wide array of evidence 
from  various  parliamentary  systems.  Without  an  understanding  of  such  fundamental 
mechanisms,  any  attempt  of  drawing  lessons  from  one  parliament  and  applying  them  to 
another must remain a futile exercise’ (Saalfeld 1995: 33).  
Although  often  criticised  for  its  lack  of  ‘discernible  relation  to  the  actual  or  possible 
behavior of flesh-and-blood human beings’ (Simon 1976: xxvii), the important advantage of 
rational choice approaches is that by attempting to establish causal relationships on the basis 
of theoretical assumptions that are defined beforehand they generate general theories that 
focus on fundamental mechanisms and can be used to explain phenomena across different 
times and places (Saalfeld 1995: 42). So far, however, this advantage has been somewhat 
underused in legislative studies, especially with regard to legislative behaviour, since ‘most of 
the legislative literature is firmly rooted in time and place, and for much of the subfield the 
place is Washington D.C.’ (Mezey 1993: 357).  Although rational choice approaches have 
been used very fruitfully to explain the impact of institutions on government formation and 
termination (Strøm 1990, Laver and Shepsle 1996), on legislative output (Doering 1995) or 
the  passage  of  legislation  through  parliaments  across  Western  Europe  (Doering  and 
Hallerberg 2004) to name just a few (for a recent overview see Gamm and Huber 2002), the 
study of individual legislative behaviour is still very much the domain of the US Congress 
literature. Gamm and Huber explain this with the fact that comparativists ‘can more easily 
study aggregate outcomes across legislatures than individual behaviour within legislatures’ 
(Gamm and Huber 2002: 325). And studies that do explain individual legislative behaviour in 
parliamentary  systems,  such  as  Strøm’s  (1997)  concept  of  parliamentary  roles  discussed 
above, still often draw exclusively on assumptions about legislative preferences derived from 
the Congressional literature.  
In the subfield of legislative studies in EU affairs, the largest part of the literature consists 
of informative but rather descriptive (collections of) single case studies detailing institutional 
provisions for parliamentary scrutiny. Truly comparative studies are still relatively rare, and 
comparative studies of legislative behaviour are almost completely absent. The paper has 
therefore attempted to develop an explanation of parliamentary behaviour that takes both, the 
specific characteristics of parliamentary systems of government as well as the institutional 
context  in  EU  affairs,  into  account.  The  explanation  is  based  on  theories  of  legislative 
behaviour and agency theory, but expands the dominant focus on the role of MPs as agents by 
systematically  integrating  the  role  of  MPs  as  principals  of  the  government.  The  main 
argument is that MPs not only pursue the goal of re-authorisation as agent, but also the aim of 
reducing agency loss in terms of government policy and behaviour.  
In EU affairs, we can expect the divergence of interests in terms of government policy to 
be greater than in domestic politics since the agenda to be decided upon does not originate 
from a program or manifesto the government and the governing party/parties agreed upon. In 
contrast to domestic politics, EU policies are initiated by an external institution, namely the 
European  Commission.  In  addition,  policies  are  also  decided  by  external  institutions,  the Council  and,  where  applicable,  the  European  Parliament.  In  European  affairs,  national 
parliaments  can  thus  be  expected  to  have  an  even  higher  incentive  to  control  their 
government.  
The instruments national parliaments have at their disposal to control the government, in 
contrast, are more restricted in EU than in domestic politics. As mentioned, within secondary 
legislation they cannot veto decisions made at the European level. MPs can only try more or 
less successfully to influence their government’s negotiation position. Yet most parliaments 
also lack the right to veto or amend (mandate) their government’s position for the negotiations 
in  the  Council.  Since  they  can  only  voice  their  opinion  without  legally  binding  the 
government, their governments usually have a large ‘zone of discretion’ in EU affairs. ‘This 
zone is constituted by (a) the sum of delegated powers (policy discretion) granted by the 
principal to the agent, minus (b) the sum of control instruments, available for use by the 
principals to shape (constrain) or annul (reverse) policy outcomes that emerge as a result of 
the agent’s performance of set tasks’ (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 5).  
Finally, influencing the government, whether through the threat of using veto power or 
through parliamentary resolutions is extremely costly, although institutional provisions can 
help  reduce  these  costs.  As  has  been  shown  above,  in  order  to  make  effective  decisions 
parliaments  need  to  overcome  the  dramatic  information  asymmetries  in  EU  affairs.  It  is 
therefore only rational for MPs to invest scarce resources such as time in the acquisition of the 
necessary information, if they can reasonably expect that their intervention will indeed reduce 
agency loss, i.e. have a considerable impact on their government’s negotiation position, and 
that  that  negotiation  position  will  also  have  a  desirable  impact  on  the  final  outcome  of 
Council negotiations. Where this is not the case, it would be irrational for MPs to invest 
scarce resources into trying to shape the government’s position. However, the fact that one 
specific strategy does not promise attractive payoffs does not mean that MPs no longer aim at 
reducing agency loss and therefore completely refrain from controlling their government. The 
preference of reducing agency loss remains, but it will be more rational for MPs to turn to less 
costly  sanctions  such  as  subjecting  Ministers  to  parliamentary  hearings  and  critical 
questioning.  
The  European  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Danish  Folketing,  for  example,  is  the  most 
powerful  in  EU  affairs  due  to  its  formal  right  to  mandate  the  government’s  negotiation 
position  but  also  due  to  the  fact  that  Danish  governments  are  very  frequently  minority 
governments.  The  Committee  is  thus  well  equipped  to  reduce  agency  loss,  since  ‘a 
government wanting to survive politically knows it will have to listen to the Committee’ 
(Laursen 2001: 105). For the government it is also vital to inform the Committee fully on the 
negotiation  situation  on  Brussels  and  the  government’s  strategic  options,  because  the 
committee  has  the  possibility  to  deny  the  mandate  as  long  as  it  is  not  satisfied  with  the 
information and explanations offered by the government. The British House of Commons, in 
contrast, is a good example for the use of alternative strategies. The institutional provisions 
for  parliamentary  scrutiny  in  the  Commons  provide  MPs  with  virtually  no  possibility  of 
binding the government even politically to a specific negotiation position: ‘At present, [a] 
motion passed by the Committee has no practical effect’ (ESC 2002: para.70). As a result, 
MPs put little effort in trying to influence the government’s negotiation position (Auel and Benz 2005). But MPs are by no means inactive in EU affairs: As Carter notes, parliamentary 
accountability of the government is achieved ‘through the expression of a strong public and 
embarrassing  voice;  someone  constantly  breathing  down  their  necks,  prepared  to  ask 
vociferously for information and to humiliate if frequently ignored’ (Carter 2001: 413).
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Secondly, it has been argued that the choice of strategies MPs employ to control their 
government will also depend on their, more important, preferences as agents, i.e. that MPs 
will choose strategies of minimising agency loss that will advance, or at least not hurt, the 
realisation  of  their  preferences  as  agents.  Since  most  European  electoral  systems  de-
emphasise the importance of personal votes, re-nomination by the party as well as the overall 
electoral success of the party rather than their own profile will determine whether or not MPs 
will (re-) gain office. It is therefore more rational – at least for MPs from the governing 
party/parties  -  to  control  the  government  behind  closed  doors  to  avoid  embarrassing  the 
government publicly and undermining their own trustworthiness as an agent. The powerful 
Danish European Affairs Committee, for example, meets and issues its mandates only behind 
firmly  closed  doors  to  avoid  making  potential  conflicts  between  the  government  and  its 
supporting parties (but also equally damaging agreements between the government and the 
opposition parties) public.  
The focus on their preference as agents also explains why MPs in moderately powerful 
parliaments  are  often  so  reluctant  to  use  parliamentary  resolutions  to  influence  the 
government. Parliamentary resolutions are necessarily public and therefore come with all the 
problems described above. It is therefore more rational to use them behind closed doors even 
if this means reverting to more informal instruments. Conducting EU affairs behind closed 
doors is therefore not irrational behaviour that cannot be explained with a rational choice 
approach (e.g. Rozenberg 2006), but a very rational strategy to pursue the goal as principal 
and agent of the party simultaneously. The German Bundestag, for example, has no formal 
veto right, but Article 23 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) clearly demands that 
‘the  Government  takes  the  Bundestag’s  resolution  into  account  in  the  negotiations’.  The 
Bundestag’s  resolution  can  therefore  be  expected  to  have  at  least  some  influence  on  the 
government’s  negotiation  position.  In  addition,  institutional  provisions  such  as  the  direct 
responsibility of the specialised Standing Committees for EU policies as well as MPs formal 
and informal contacts to EU actors and MPs from other member states help reduce the cost. 
However, since MPs from the governing parties are perfectly aware of the disadvantages of 
public resolutions, they make very rare use of it, but resort to informally influencing the 
government  in  the  private  working  groups  of  the  parliamentary  party  groups.  Public 
resolutions are only occasionally used to support the government’s negotiation position, or, in 
exceptional situations, to force a reluctant government to adopt the parliamentary position if 
informal negotiations have failed (Auel 2006).  
                                                        
16   That the government does indeed take the parliamentary scrutiny powers seriously, is illustrated by the 
‘Guide to Better European Regulation’, where the Cabinet office reminded government officials that the 
information given to parliament ‘should explain fully the policy and legal implications of a proposal for 
the UK and the reasons for supporting or opposing its provisions … You should bear in mind that 
scrutiny committees that are not satisfied that they have been properly informed about any proposal 
have the option of inviting Ministers to give evidence on it’ (Cabinet Office 1999: 20). In the House of Commons, in contrast, MPs do not shy away from the strategy of ‘public 
embarrassment’  to  sanction  the  government  for  the  failure  to  adhere  to  parliamentary 
information rights or parliamentary rules, such as the scrutiny reserve. While the majority 
usually  supports  its  government  loyally  in  public  debates  in  the  European  Standing 
Committees  or  on  the  Floor  of  the  House  against  criticism  expressed  by  the  opposition, 
ministers  are,  for  example  regularly  cited  before  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee  to 
question them publicly on such procedural wrongdoings. As a former Chair of the European 
Scrutiny committee put it in a personal interview: ‘Our job is to hunt them’. Such public 
‘evidence sessions’ can be very uncomfortable for ministers, as they generally have to face 
the  committee  alone,  without  a  large  staff,  to  answer  questions  unknown  beforehand. 
Nevertheless, even their own party members quite often fiercely attack ministers. Even the 
opposition  admits  that  the  Labour  members  in  the  committee  ‘act  as  a  group  of 
parliamentarians, not as party members’ (personal interview).  
To sum up, as a result of the challenges of European integration national parliaments have 
set up specific institutions and scrutiny procedures, in other words designed specific contracts 
with their governments that detail their formal involvement in EU affairs. However, while 
important, focussing on these institutional provisions alone paints a very incomplete picture 
of parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs. We therefore need to study actual parliamentary 
behaviour in more detail to assess the role national parliaments play in EU politics. Yet the 
existing  literature  on  legislative  behaviour  is  still  too  much  focused  on  one  particular 
institution, the US Congress. And while the insights from this body of literature are very 
helpful in analysing legislative behaviour in parliamentary systems as well, they cover only 
part of the parliamentary story. The paper has therefore attempted to develop an explanation 
for  parliamentary  behaviour  that  takes  both,  the  specific  characteristics  of  parliamentary 
systems of government as well as the institutional context in EU affairs, into account. It 
provides an analytical framework that views parliamentary behaviour as strategies used by 
MPs  to  pursue  their  preferences  as  both  agents  and  principals  in  the  context  of  specific 
institutional  opportunities  and  constraints.  And  while  the  paper  focused  on  legislative 
behaviour in EU affairs, the framework can also, admittedly with amendments, be further 
developed to explain legislative behaviour in parliamentary systems in more general. 
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